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INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS: THE PRESSURE ON
IRAN TO ABANDON NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
Jamie Lang*

INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 2007, the United Nations Security Council unanimously
approved stringent sanctions intended to deter Iran's nuclear ambitions. These
sanctions were issued in response to Iran's failure to comply with previous
sanctions issued by the Security Council in December 2006. Despite the efforts
of the Security Council, Iran has vowed to continue nuclear development. The
Iranian government has asserted that Iran's nuclear development is intended
only for peaceful use. However, Iran has failed to be candid about its nuclear
activities. A February 2006 report from the International Atomic Energy
Agency ("IAEA") revealed that Iran has expanded its nuclear program more
quickly than expected. Experts predict that Iran could potentially produce a
nuclear bomb within the next few years.
Iran's nuclear development is a cause for international concern.
Recently, tensions have further escalated in the Middle East. The U.S. has
accused Iran of providing weapons to insurgents battling against the U.S.
military in Iraq. Adding to the turmoil, Iran captured 15 British sailors off the
coast of Iran and accused them of espionage. Iran has a turbulent history of
providing funding and weapons to terrorist groups like Hizballah and Hamas.
There are significant dangers of a nuclear Iran. If Iran were to attain a nuclear
bomb, the country might be able to support terrorism more aggressively,
because Iran would be less worried about retaliation from the U.S. and other
nations. Other Middle Eastern nations might also develop nuclear weapons as a
deterrent, contributing to unstable conditions in an area of the world where
tension already exists.
U.N. sanctions have failed to impede Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad's nuclear program expansion. During the negotiations which led
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to the pre-2007 sanctions, Russia and China opposed strict penalties supported
by the U.S. and its European allies. The current trade relationships between
members of the Security Council and Iran could explain the positions taken by
each member with regard to penalizing Iran. Realizing that U.N. sanctions are
not enough to stop Iran's nuclear proliferation, the U.S. has sought to prevent
international financial funding to Iran by pressing foreign countries to refuse to
deal with Iran. An analysis of the social climate in Iran reveals that President
Ahmadinejad's policies are losing both political and popular support.
Continued international pressure is necessary to compel Iran to cooperate with
the IAEA.
Part I of this note will discuss the U.N. Security Council sanctions
imposed in December 2006 and March 2007, as well as Iran's response to these
sanctions. Part II will explore Iran's evasiveness regarding current nuclear
development and assess reports of Iran's recent nuclear milestones. Part III will
review the history of Iran's relationship with the U.S. Part IV will examine the
reluctance of China and Russia to impose strict sanctions on Iran because of
each country's significant economic ties with Iran. Part V will explain new
tactics employed by the U.S. to prevent international financial funding to Iran's
illicit activities. Part VI will analyze the effects of increasing international
pressure on Iran's social and political climate. Finally, Part VII will evaluate
the likelihood of war with Iran.

I. U.N SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS FAIL TO IMPEDE IRAN'S
NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
On December 23, 2006, the Security Council unanimously approved
sanctions designed to curtail Iran's nuclear development.' The resolution,
prepared by Germany and the Security Council's five permanent members-the
United States, Britain, France, Russia and China- represented the culmination
of months of negotiations to determine the proper sanctions to impose in
response to Iran's failure to adhere to the Security Council's demand that
nuclear activities be suspended by August 31, 2006.2
Sanctions included a ban on the import and export of materials and
technology used in uranium enrichment and ballistic missiles. 3 The resolution
also froze the assets of 12 individuals and 10 entities involved in Iran's nuclear

1 Elissa

Gootman, Security CouncilApproves Sanctions Against Iran Over Nuclear Program,N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, at A18.
2

Id.

3 S.C. Res. 1737, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1737 (Dec. 23, 2006).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/jibl/vol6/iss1/7

2

Lang: International Sanctions: The Pressure on Iran to Abandon Nuclear

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

and ballistic missile programs. 4 In addition, the Director General of the IAEA
was required to report to the Security Council within 60 days on whether Iran
had complied with sanctions and suspended its enrichment program.5 Also
included in the resolution was a warning to Iran that failure to comply would
result in further sanctions. 6 The resolution, however, restricted further measures
to nonmilitary actions.7
The U.N. has come under attack for delaying the imposition of
sanctions on Iran. 8 Critics argue that "nothing of any seriousness comes out of
the U.N." 9 The U.N. is "supposed to embody... 'collective security[,]' but
critics argue that "ift]'s an illusion[.] "''
Instead, member nations avoid
resolutions that could potentially conflict with their own interests."' For
example, the U.N. has been criticized for failing to effectively deal with the
situation in Darfur. 12 The U.S. defined genocide as the "displacement,
starvation, rape and mass slaughter" of hundreds of thousands of civilians in
Darfur by the government of Sudan and its allied Janjaweed militias. 13 The
Security Council has passed resolutions which call for the Sudanese
government to disarm the Janjaweed, and the Security Council has also
authorized a U.N. peacekeeping force. 14 However, these efforts have proven
ineffective, and experts have called for further action by the Security Council to
deploy a peacekeeping force with orders to protect civilians by force if
necessary.15 China, a permanent member of the Security Council, has presented16
a stumbling block to international efforts to end the genocide in Darfur.
China's dependence on the area for oil has led its government to oppose
"forceful intervention in Sudan's sovereign affairs."' 17 As a result of member
nations' individual interests, the U.N. has continued to play the role of a passive
bystander when confronted with pressing international issues, and Iran's nuclear

4 Id. at 4.
' Id. at 7.
6 id.
7 Gootman, supra note 1.
8 Charles Krauthammer, But Not At The U.N., TIME, Oct. 23, 2006, at 39.
9 Id.
1oId.
1Id.
12 UN: A Chancefor a Safter World, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 6, 2007, at 40.
13Save Darfur: Policy Talking Points, available at http://www.savedarfur.org/pages/background/
(last modified March 1, 2007).
14 Id.
15 Id.

16 UN: A Chancefor a Safer World, supra note 12.
17 Id.
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program is no exception.' 8 The U.N. has been criticized for postponing
sanctions on Iran because of Russian and Chinese economic interests. 19
The December 2006 resolution, considerably weaker than earlier
proposed 2°resolutions, did little to compel Iran to discontinue its nuclear

activities. ~Russia, which has strong economic ties with Iran, objected to
22

previously proposed resolutions. 2' China, also economically linked to Iran,
often supported objections made by Russia during negotiations. 22 During
negotiations Russian Ambassador Vitaly I. Churkin objected to language in the
sanctions that would threaten Russia's current business deals.23 In order to
facilitate a solution, the U.S. and its European allies agreed to eliminate a travel
ban on Iranians suspected of involvement in nuclear activities. 24 Previous drafts
of the resolution directed "that all states 'prevent entry' of such people, [but] the
final version of the resolution simply 'calls upon' states to 'exercise vigilance'
over their borders. 25 To appease Russia, the other Security Council members
agreed to exclude any sanctions against a nuclear power plant that Russia is
building in Bushehr, Iran.26 In addition, prior to approving the resolution,
Russia demanded the removal of Aerospace Industries Organization from the
list of companies involved in Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
In response to the Security Council's sanctions, Iranian officials
defiantly vowed to continue nuclear development.28 Iran insists that it is
entitled to enrich uranium under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.29
Immediately following the announcement of Security Council sanctions,
President Ahmadinejad declared that "nuclear technology is our right, and no
one can take it away from us.,, 30 Ahmadinejad also warned that the U.S. would

18 Krauthammer, supra note 8.
19 Id.
20 Helene

Cooper & Steven R. Weisman, West Tries a New Tack to Block Iran's Nuclear Agenda,

N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2007, at A3.
21 Gootman, supra note 1.
22 id.

23 Warren Hoge, U.N. Draft Resolution on Iran Loosens Travel Ban and Time Limits, N.Y. TIMES,

Dec. 21, 2006, at A26.
24 id.
25Gootman, supra note 1.
26Colum Lynch, U.N. Security Council Votes to Restrict Iran's Trade in Nuclear Materials,WASH.
POST, Dec. 24, 2006, availableat 2006 WLNR 22436326..
27 Id.
28 Nazila Fathi, Iran is Defiant, Vowing to U.N. It Will Continue Nuclear Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.

25, 2006, at A14.
29 id.

30id.
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regret the imposition of these sanctions. 3 1 Ali Larijani, Iran's Chief Nuclear
Negotiator, was unfazed by the Security Council sanctions, and said that Iran's
response to the resolution would be to "begin activities
at Natanz-site of 3,000
32
centrifuges-and we will drive with full speed.,
However, a milder reaction from members of the Iranian Parliament
demonstrated the willingness of some members to cooperate with the U.N.33
Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, said,
"Our efforts should be reasonable and moderate[, which] means we should be
after getting our rights and also show that we are not after a fight[;] if they are
willing to recognize our rights, we will cooperate. ' 34 Kazem Jalali, a member
of Parliament and its foreign policy committee, said that "it did not appear to be
the right time to bar United Nations' inspectors or withdraw from the
treaty[.] ' '35 Muhammad Saeedi, the deputy leader of the country's Atomic
Energy Organization, "doubted a majority in Parliament wanted to pull out" of
the IAEA.36
On March 24, 2007, in response to Iran's failure to comply with
December 2006 sanctions, the Security Council unanimously approved a
resolution containing more stringent sanctions.37 The new resolution froze the
foreign assets of 15 individuals and 13 entities involved in nuclear or ballistic
missile activities or the Revolutionary Guard in addition to those already listed
in the December 2006 sanctions.38 The resolution instructed the Director
General of the IAEA to issue a report within 60 days about whether Iran had
complied with the new sanctions and suspended its nuclear activities. 39 The
sanctions did not include a travel ban for Iranians suspected of nuclear activity,
as had been previously proposed by the U.S. and its allies, but instead called
upon member states "to exercise vigilance and restraint regarding entry into or
transit through their territories" of individuals engaged in nuclear activities. 4 °
Iran appeared unmoved by the adoption of more stringent sanctions,

31 Id.
32

Id.

33 Nazila Fathi, Iran Parliament Debates Reply to U.N. Penalties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006, at

A3.
.4Fathi, supra note 28.
35 Fathi, supra note 33.
36id.
37 Thorn Shanker, Security Council Votes to Tighten Iran Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, March 25, 2007,
at 11.
38 S.C. Res. 1747, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1747 (March 24, 2007).
39 Id. at 3.
40 Colum Lynch, U.N. Backs Broader Sanctions on Tehran, WASH. POST, March 25, 2007, at Al.
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and asserted that its nuclear program would not be suspended. 4 1 Following the
unanimous approval of sanctions, Iran Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki
told the Security Council that its sanctions were "unlawful, unnecessary, and
unjustifiable. 4 2 Iran also announced that it would limit cooperation with the
IAEA and will no longer provide information to the IAEA prior to developing
new facilities capable of producing atomic fuel.43

II. RECENT NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN
Although President Ahmadinejad claims that the nuclear fuel cycle is
needed only to run fuel reactors and generate electricity, the international
community has questioned his true intentions where nuclear development is
concerned. 44 Experts speculate that Iran is adamant in its quest for a nuclear
weapon because Iran fears that the U.S. wants to destroy the Islamic Republic
and a nuclear weapon would help ensure the regime's security.45 Iran also
likely desires a nuclear weapon to increase Iran's influence in the Middle East.46
Possession of a nuclear weapon is a status symbol and Iran wants to show that it
is a major power in the Middle East.47
Iran has asserted that it has the right to continue nuclear development
under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which it signed in 1970.48

The

Treaty permitted Iran "to pursue peaceful nuclear development under the
watchful eyes of the IAEA.,, 49 However, on July 31, 2006, amid continuing
reports that Iran was not fully cooperating with the IAEA, the Security Council
adopted a resolution that mandated suspension of Iran's nuclear enrichment and
processing by August 31, 2006. 50 In December 2006, sanctions were issued in
response to Iran's failure to suspend nuclear enrichment by the Security

41

Id.

42

id.

43 Thom Shanker & William J. Broad, Iran to Limit Cooperation With Nuclear Inspectors, N.Y.

TIMES, March 26, 2007, at A6.
4 William J. Broad & Nazila Fathi, Iran's Leader Cites Progresson Nuclear Plans, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 15, 2006, at A8.
45 Daniel Byman, Director, Center for Peace and Security Stud., The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Latest
Developments and Next Steps, Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia (Mar. 15, 2007).
46

id.

47 id.
48 Johanna McGeary, What Will Make Them Stop? Carrots? Sticks? Inside Bush's Diplomatic
Struggle to PersuadeIran and North Korea to Give Up Their Nuke Programs, TIME, Nov. 3, 2003,
at 36.
49 id.
'o S.C. Res. 1696, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1696 (July 31, 2006).
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Council's deadline.51
The IAEA, although unable to prove that Iran's nuclear fuel is being
used for nuclear weapons, revealed in its June 2006 report that Iran continued to
evade questions about its atomic program.52 The report noted that "Iran [had]
failed to provide full access to records needed to confirm its claims in June of
having enriched uranium to a level of 5 percent, which is suitable for
reactors. 53 In addition, "inspectors [had not resolved] the origin of previously
discovered traces of highly enriched uranium[.],, 54 The report also disclosed
that "inspectors [had] recently found traces of yet another unexplained
particle-plutonium-on samples from containers at Karaj. '5 Plutonium and
uranium are both used to fuel atomic bombs.56
Significant dangers would be presented by a nuclear Iran.57 Experts
fear that if Iran produces a nuclear bomb, it might begin to support terrorism
more aggressively, because retaliation by the U.S. and other nations would be
less likely. 58 A nuclear weapon in the hands of the Iranian government might
also cause other Middle Eastern countries, fearful about Iran's intentions, to
develop a nuclear weapon as a deterrent. 59 Nations observing the situation in
Iran might also conclude that they could also acquire a nuclear weapon without
risking serious repercussions, which could further aggravate existing
international conflicts.6 °
Increasing international pressure has not deterred Iran; instead, it may
have motivated the Iranian government to press on with its nuclear program. In
February 2007, the IAEA reported that Iran was operating or close to operating
1,000 centrifuges that are capable of enriching uranium at its nuclear facility in
Natanz.61 David Albright, a former inspector and president of the Institute for
Science and International Security, stated that "[tihey are installing faster than
was commonly expected. 62 This report came as a surprise to many experts
who did not believe Iran was capable of expanding its nuclear program so
51 Lynch, supra note 26.
52 Broad & Fathi, supra note 44.
53 Id.
54 Id.
33 id.
56 Id.

57 Byman, supra note 45.
58 Id.
59 Id.

6 id.
61 David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Iran Expanding Nuclear Efforts, Agency Reports, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at Al.
62 id.
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quickly. 63 However, the report also confirmed that Iran had not met its nuclear
goals. 64 In February of 2006, Iran claimed that it would have 3,000 centrifuges
running by February of 2007.65 Unfortunately, inspectors believe that Iran will
be able to make up the shortfall and have 3,000 centrifuges operational by May
2007.66
In addition to its nuclear activities, Iran has also demonstrated its
defiant attitude toward U.N. sanctions by test firing missiles. In January 2007,
Revolutionary Guards tested fire missiles in a three-day military exercise. 67 The
Guards fired Zelzal and Fajr-5 68
missiles near the city of Garmsar, which is 60
miles outside the capital of Iran.

III. HISTORY OF UNITED STATES' TRADE SANCTIONS WITH IRAN
In 1951, when Iran's parliament voted to nationalize the oil industry,
Great Britain and the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
developed a plan to overthrow Prime Minister Mossadeqh and install a new
leader. 69 The Prime Minister was successfully overthrown and replaced with
the Shah. 70 The Shah ruled Iran for 26 years as monarch, during which time the
U.S. and Britain exercised great influence over him to satisfy their economic
interests. 71 However, the Shah's excessive spending contributed to the
disillusionment of the Iranian people as the country's economy suffered.72 At
the same time, the Ayatollah Khomeini, an exiled Islamic leader, gained a large
following.73 On January 16, 1979, revolutionaries forced the Shah into exile
and Ayatollah Khomeini became leader.74 In the midst of the revolution,
university students climbed the wall of the United States Embassy and took 52
hostages on November 4, 1979. 75 Ten days later, President Carter issued
Executive Order 12,170 in response to the hostage situation, which declared a
63

id.

64 Id.
65 id.
66

67

id.
Nazila Fathi, Iran'sLeader Stands by Nuclear Plans; Military Plans Exercises, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.

22, 2007, at A4.
68 Id.
69Layla Nouraee, Reassessing U.S. Policy Toward Iran: Stimulating Reform Through Economic
Means, 25 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 535, 538 (2002).
70 id.
71 id.
72 Id. at 539.
71 ld. at 540.
74 Id.
7'

Id. at 542.
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national emergency with respect to Iran.76 The Executive Order "blocked all
property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its
instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are
or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are in or
come within the possession or control of persons subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. 77
In 1984, Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism
after it was determined that Iran was responsible for the bombing of Marine
barracks in Beirut in 1983.78 The United States "blocked Iran from receiving
U.S. foreign aid, sales of items on the U.S. munitions list, Eximbank credits,
and U.S. support for foreign loans, and require[d] strict licensing requirements
for any U.S. exports of controlled goods or technology. 79
On March 15, 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12,957,
entitled "Prohibiting Certain Transactions with Respect to the Development of
Iranian Petroleum Resources. '"8 Executive Order 12,957 was issued after the
President had learned that the U.S. firm Conoco, Inc. had inked a deal with Iran
to develop oil fields on Iran's Sirri Island. 81 The order prohibited any "United
States person" from making "a contract that includes overall supervision and
management responsibility for the development of petroleum resources located
in Iran" or making "a contract for the financing of the development of
petroleum resources located in Iran."8 2 Following the issuance of Executive
Order 12,957, Conoco withdrew from its contract with Iran. 3
On May 6, 1995, President Clinton extended the scope of sanctions
with Iran by signing Executive Order 12,959, entitled "Prohibiting Certain
Transactions With Respect to Iran." 84 Executive Order 12,959 prohibited "the
importation into the United States, or the financing of such importation, of any
goods or services of Iranian origin" as well as "the exportation from the United
States to Iran, the Government of Iran, or to any entity owned or controlled by
the Government of Iran, or the financing of such exportation, of any goods,
technology, or services[.],,8 5 The order also prohibited the re-exportation by a

76Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979).
77 id.

78 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 9 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298.
79 Id.

80 Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995).

81 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 9 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298.
82Exec. Order No. 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995).
83H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 9 (1996), reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298.
8 Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995).
85 Id.
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third country of any goods or technology exported from the United States to
Iran. 86 Executive Order 12,959 forbade foreign affiliates of U.S. oil companies
from purchasing Iran's oil exports for overseas trade.87 Prior to this order, such88
foreign affiliates had been procuring 25% of Iran's oil exports.
Undersecretary of State Peter Tarnoff said, "The President's decision to sever
American trade and investment with Iran signaled our commitment to exert the
maximum efforts of this country to deny Iran financial resources." 89 By
forbidding American investment, President Clinton hoped to cut off the flow of
money from the U.S. to Iran. 90
Although President Clinton's Executive Orders were meant to isolate
Iran, they had little impact on the interaction of U.S. allies with Iran. 91 Allies of
the U.S. failed to follow President Clinton's lead by initiating any trade or
investment bans against Iran.92 On July 13, 1995, Total SA, a French company,
signed a contract with Iran to develop oil fields on the Sirri Islands following
the withdrawal of the U.S. company Conoco. 9 3 Iran also appeared unaffected
by the sanctions. 94 The country found new purchasers for its oil resources that
had previously been purchased by U.S. companies and their affiliates. 95 It also
began negotiating ten multi-million dollar petroleum projects with foreign
investors. 96 These developments convinced Congress and the President that
"[further] steps were needed to choke off foreign investment in Iran's oil
industry. 97
On August 5, 1996, President Clinton signed the Iran and Libya
Sanctions Act of 1996 (the "Act"). 98 The Act was aimed at furthering the U.S.
policy of limiting Iran's revenues and petroleum resources. 99 It reinforced the
opposition of the U.S. to Iran's support of international terrorism, and continued

86 id.

87H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1299.
88 Id.

'9 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298.
9 Id.
91 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1299.
92 id.
9' S. Rep. No. 104-187, pt. 1, at 10 (1995), reprinted in 1995 WL 747811 1, 3.
94 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N 1296, 1299.
95 id.
96 Id.
97 Id.

98Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541 (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1996)).
99 H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1,at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1298.
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efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.'0° Testifying before the Senate,
Mr. Tarnoff stated that "[a] straight line [linked] Iran's oil income and its ability
to sponsor terrorism, build weapons of mass destruction, and acquire
sophisticated armaments."' 0'1 The Act sought to prevent Iran from further
developing its petroleum resources by imposing sanctions on foreign
investment. 10 2 The policy sanctions were expected to "deny Iran the revenues
and resources to develop weapons of mass destruction and fund groups that
commit[ted] international terrorism and acts designed to derail the Arab-Israeli
peace process."' 0 3 The U.S. recognized Iran's need for foreign investment,
and
4
believed that Iran would abandon its policies under economic pressure.'0
The Act imposed sanctions on anyone who invested more than $20
million in one year for the purpose of "directly and significantly contribut[ing]
to the enhancement of Iran's ability to develop [its] petroleum resources." ' 5 A
violation of the Act would give the President the ability to impose two of six
possible sanctions, including:
denial of Eximbank assistance for any exports to the sanctioned
person; denial of specific licenses for exports of controlled technology to the
sanctioned person and prohibition on imports from that company; a prohibition
on a sanctioned financial institution from serving as a primary dealer in U.S.
Government bonds or as a repository for U.S. Government funds; a prohibition
on any U.S. financial institution from making any loan to a sanctioned person
over $10 million per year; and a ban on any U.S.
Government procurement of
0 6
any goods or services from a sanctioned person.'
Under the Act, the President could also waive sanctions under certain
criteria. 10 7 The Act also provided for the withdrawal of sanctions if Iran
stopped manufacturing or acquiring weapons
of mass destruction and if Iran
08
stopped supporting international terrorism.'
The enactment of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act was immediately met
with opposition from allies of the U.S.'0 9 U.S. allies did not oppose the

10oId.
101Id.
id.
'03H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 10 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1299.
114 Id.
102

105Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, 1543 (codified at 50

U.S.C. § 1701 (1996)).
106
H.R. Rep. No. 104-523, pt. 1, at 8 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1296, 1297.
'07Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541, 1547 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1996)).
log Id.

109Bruce W. Nelan, Taking on the World: Clinton says the New Long Arm of Uncle Sam is Striking
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government's goal of fighting terrorism, but were outraged by U.S. efforts to
control the extent of their foreign investments in Iran." ° Yves Doutriaux,
spokesman for the French Foreign Ministry, commented that the United States
"[was] one nation telling the rest on the earth what they can and can't do.""'
Many countries believed that the law was unlikely to curb Iran's objectionable
behavior."12 U.S. allies wondered whether the passage of the Iran sanctions bill,
as well as a similar bill dealing with Cuba, were merely a tactic employed to
bolster support for President Clinton's re-election campaign, since he had
previously opposed both bills." 3
Sir Leon Brittan, the European Commission's chief trade negotiator,
brought the issue before the World Trade Organization." 14 President Clinton5
was subsequently forced to waive European sanctions to avoid conflict."
Other nations condemned the Act following its passage. A week after President
Clinton had signed the Act, Turkish Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan went
ahead with a planned trip to Iran." 16 The Prime Minister ignored Mr. Tarnoffs7
warning that Turkey would be contradicting U.S. efforts to isolate Tehran. "
The Turkish government
claimed that it was "not investing in Iran[,] but simply
' 18
buying its gas[.]"
The Iran Libya Sanctions Act was also opposed by U.S.
corporations." 9 In April 1997, USA-Engage was formed by 500 companies to
lobby against the overuse of unilateral trade sanctions by the U.S. 120 American
businesses are often the ones to suffer as a result of unilateral sanctions, since
foreign companies are likely to replace them.12 U.S. unilateral sanctions cost
the U.S. economy an estimated $15 to $19 billion and 260,000 jobs in 1995.122
Many corporate executives complained that the U.S. government's policy of
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unilateral sanctions gave American companies a reputation for being
unreliable. '23
The U.S. has never sanctioned any entity for a violation of the Iran
Libya Sanctions Act. 24 Due to the European Union's opposition to the Act, the
U.S. and the E.U. agreed to avoid confrontation over the Act. 125 The E.U.
"pledged to increase cooperation with the United States on non-proliferation
and counter-terrorism. ''126 As a result, President Clinton waived sanctions for
France's Total SA project-as well as for its partners, Gazprom of Russia and
Pars gas field,
Petronas of Malaysia-with respect to development of the South
127
after such development had been deemed a violation of the Act.
Various projects have been investigated for violations of the Act, but
no sanctions were ever pronounced by President Clinton or President Bush.' 28
These projects include: Elf Aquitaine (France) and ENI's (Italy) project to
develop the Doroud oil field, worth approximately $1 billion; a contract with
Elf Aquitaine and Bow Valley (Canada) to develop the Balal oil field, estimated
at $300 million; a contract with Royal Dutch (U.K.) and Shell (the Netherlands)
to develop the Soroush and Nowruz oil fields, worth approximately $800
million; and a contract
with GVA Consultants (Sweden) to explore for oil under
129
the Caspian Sea.
IV. SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS RUSSIA AND CHINA RESIST
STRINGENT SANCTIONS
The five permanent Security Council member nations negotiated
proposed sanctions for Iran for months before agreeing to a final solution in
December 2006.130 While the U.S. called for strict sanctions to punish Iran for
its defiance of the Security Council's demands to suspend nuclear enrichment,
13 1
Russia and China were reluctant to impose more stringent sanctions.
Although a final resolution was unanimously approved by all permanent
members of the Security Council, including Russia and China, the final

123 id.
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resolution proved to be much weaker than earlier proposed solutions. 3 2 A close
look at China and Russia's economic relations with Iran reveals why each
country has resisted implementing tough sanctions. 133 Since both Russia and
China have strong economic ties to Iran, stricter sanctions could have a
significant financial impact on them, whereas the U.S. would have little to lose
because of its limited economic relationship with Iran.
Statistics reveal that the U.S. has a more limited economic relationship
with Iran than other Security Council members. Iran's trade with Security
Council members, excluding the U.S., was estimated to have topped $22 billion
in 2006, up from $18 billion in 2005.34 During the first half of 2006, the U.S.
imported only $99 million worth of goods from Iran, and exported only $55
million of goods to Iran. 135 The U.S. primarily imports rugs, nuts, and136juice
from Iran, and exports cigarettes, pharmaceuticals, and wood pulp to Iran.
Although Russia and China have denied that their economic ties to Iran
control their stance on sanctions, it appears that their financial relationships
with Iran have indeed influenced the positions they have taken.' 37 China is
largely dependent on the Middle East for oil. 138 An estimated 45% of China's
oil imports in 2006 were from the Middle East.1 39 China gets an estimated 18%
of its crude oil from Iran. 140 In 2006, Iran was China's third-biggest supplier of
oil, providing 12% of the total amount of oil China receives. 141 China imported
$5.16 billion of oil from Iran in 2006, which amounted to a 56% increase on the
importation of oil from Iran in 2005.142 China has also inked a 25-year deal
with Iran, worth up to $100 billion,
to develop a key oil field at Yadavaran, and
14 3
also to buy oil and gas from Iran.
China's exports to Iran have significantly risen in the last four years. 44
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14 5
During the first half of 2006, Chinese exports to Iran increased by 25%.
Chinese companies ship over $700 million dollars worth of goods to Iran,
including air conditioners, engines, washing machines, and trucks. 146 China, a
large international arms supplier, also supplies weapons to Iran. 147 Currently,
also employed in Tehran's transit system,
Chinese construction companies are
148
power plants and merchant ships.

China's position on international issues demonstrates the government's
reluctance to support Security Council measures that could potentially interrupt
its oil supply.' 49 For example, China has been unwilling to take punitive action
against Sudan for its involvement with the genocide taking place in Darfur.' 5"
Sudan supplies China with 3% of its crude oil and China is averse to disrupting
its investment in Sudan's oil infrastructure. 15' Similarly, during Security
Council negotiations, China objected to proposals for strict sanctions in Iran, in
an apparent effort to protect its own economic interests there. 152
However, China has also demonstrated increasing support of
international efforts to compel Iran to cooperate with the IAEA. China's
endorsement of the December 2006 Security Council sanctions was "an
important symbolic act."' ' 53 Experts believe that since China is heavily
dependent on the Middle East for oil, the Chinese government realizes that it
has "little choice but to support efforts to stabilize the region."' 154 China's U.N.
Ambassador, Wang Guangya, has recently attempted to persuade the
government of Sudan to agree to accept U.N. intervention in Darfur. 55 China,
although at odds with American tactics to dismantle Iran's nuclear program, it
"share[s] the same broad objectives.' 56 Russia, which has significantly
supportive of
influenced China's position on Iran, has also been increasingly
57
nuclear containment. China may be following Russia's lead.1
A meeting between Mr. Larijani, Secretary of Iran's National Security
Council, and Mr. Hu, China's President, to discuss the Security Council
145King & Champion, supra note 133.
146
147

Id.
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148King & Champion, supra note 133.
141 Chinese ForeignPolicy: A

Quintet, Anyone?, supra note 138.

150id.
151 Id.
152 Gootman,

supra note 1.
153Chinese ForeignPolicy: A Quintet Anyone?, supra note 138.
154Id.
155 id.
156 Id.
157 id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

15

Journal of International Business and Law, Vol. 6, Iss. 1 [2007], Art. 7

THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS & LAW

sanctions highlighted China's diverging interests. 158 China recommended that
Iran take the U.N. Security Council resolution seriously.' 59 Demonstrating
China's support for the imposition of sanctions, Mr. Hu relayed that sanctions
were "the shared concerns of the international community over the Iranian
nuclear issue[.]' 160 However, President Hu subsequently backed down from
that position, claiming that "China continue[d] to believe the Iranian nuclear
issue should be resolved through diplomatic negotiation[J" which illustrated
China's aversion to military action to deal with Iran.16 1 Mr. Larijani, in turn,
blamed China's support of the Security Council's sanctions on the U.S., and
announced that commercial
ties between China and Iran would not be affected
62
by China's vote.1
Although Russia's trade relations with Iran are more limited than
Iran's trade relations with the E.U. and China, strict sanctions could disrupt
Russia's financial investment in Iran.' 6 3 Currently, Russia is building a nuclear
power plant in Bushehr worth $800 million dollars. Additionally, Russia also
has construction contracts worth $5 billion dollars and arms contracts worth
$1.5 billion dollars. 164 In January 2007, despite the imposition of the December
2006 sanctions, Russia sold Iran $700 million worth of TOR-MI antiaircraft
65
batteries. 1
Russia played a major role in delaying approval of the Security
Council's imposition of sanctions on Iran. 166 Permanent members were forced
to appease Russia's demands in order to secure Russia's vote in favor of
sanctions. 67 Mr. Churkin, Russia's Ambassador to the U.N., expressed
concerns during negotiations that certain language in the resolution would
threaten Russia's current business deals. 168 In order to facilitate a solution,
Security Council members eliminated a mandatory travel ban on Iranians
allegedly involved in Iran's nuclear program.' 69 Russia objected to a draft of
the resolution which directed that states "prevent entry" of Iranians involved in

158
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nuclear activities.1 70 Instead, the final version of the resolution left it to
individual countries to "exercise vigilance" over their borders. 7 1 The final
version also excluded sanctions against a nuclear power plant that Russia is
building in Bushehr, and excluded Aerospace Industries Organization from the
list of companies involved in Iran's ballistic missile
program, in accordance
172
with Russia's demands during the negotiation stage.
Recently Russia has demonstrated a greater commitment to containing
Iran's nuclear ambitions. 173 In March 2007, Russia told Iran that it would not
deliver nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power plant unless Iran complies
with U.N. sanctions. 174 Russia is also said to be pulling technicians, engineers
and other specialists from the power plant, which could cause serious delays in
production. 75 Experts believe that although Russia wants to protect its
economic interests in Iran, Russia does not want to see Iran acquire a nuclear
weapon. 176
V. U.S. POLICY INCREASES INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL PRESSURE
ON IRAN
The U.S. and its European allies have acknowledged that the Security
Council sanctions are too weak to compel Iran to suspend its nuclear
activities. 177 The U.S. and its allies have since implemented a new tactic to
increase international financial pressure on Iran by persuading foreign
governments and banks to cut ties with Iran. 178 The Treasury Department has
been working to persuade Western banks to refrain from doing business with
Iran. 7 9 During IMF and World Bank meetings in September 2006, Treasury
Secretary Henry M. Paulson Jr. warned financial institutions and government
officials about the potential costs of doing business with Iran. 180 Paulson,
Treasury Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levy,
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and Treasury Deputy Secretary Robert M. Kimmitt have all held meetings with
banks to explain Iran's use of deceptive practices to finance illicit business
activities. 18
The U.S. announced in January 2007 that American financial
182
institutions are barred from doing business with Bank Sepah, an Iranian bank.
The ban "applies to domestic and foreign branches of American banks, as well
as to American citizens working at overseas banks that deal with Bank Sepah
anywhere in the world. ' 83 American banks must refrain from transferring
dollars to Bank Sepah or its branches and subsidiaries.1 84 Bank Sepah has
subsidiaries in Rome, London, Frankfurt and Paris. 85 In September 2006, the
United States barred American financial institutions from dealing with another
Iranian bank, Bank Saerat, after determining that the bank had been involved in
financing terrorist acts. 186 Bank Sepah is thought to be "the financial linchpin
of Iran's missile procurement network, and has actively assisted Iran's pursuit
of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction[.]' ' 187 Bank Sepah
has provided financing to Iran's Aerospace Industries Organization and two
Iranian missile companies.' 88 Bank Sepah is also believed to have been used to
facilitate business between Iran's Aerospace Industries
Organization and a
89
North Korean group that exports missile technologies.
The U.S. and its allies hope that increased international financial
pressure will finally persuade Iran to cooperate with the Security Council. The
new strategy has already resulted in some early success. 190 In the past,
European countries have opposed U.S. policies which affect them without their
consent, as evidenced by the international protest following the adoption of the
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act. 191 However, the Bush administration has not
backed down, and financial institutions in Europe and Asia have begun cutting
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back business with Iran. 192 The Treasury Department reported that 40
international banks and financial institutions have either limited or severed
UBS, HSBC, Standard Chartered, and
economic ties with Iran. 93
Commerzbank have reported that they are limiting business with Iran. 194 The
March 2007 sanctions also added Bank Sepah to the list of entities involved in
Iran's nuclear and ballistic missile activities. 195 Security Council members will
now be prevented from doing business with the bank.' 96
As a result of the U.S. government's efforts, the Japanese government
197
has also expressed their willingness to limit business dealings with Iran.
Japan is not a member of the Security Council, but the country is heavily
dependent on the Middle East for oil.' 98 Therefore, Japan's support will be
crucial to the success of this strategy.' 99 Citing concerns about Iran's nuclear
program, Japan has reduced its stake in a $2 billion deal to develop Iran's
largest onshore oil field at Azadegan to 10%, down from 75%.200 In December

2006, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation announced that it would
refrain from issuing any new loans for Iranian projects until Iran cooperated
with the international community's demands to stop nuclear development.2 0'
Another tactic being used by the U.S. and Europe is to "undermin[e]
20 2
the self-assurance of Iranian officials, especially those who travel abroad.,
American troops in Iraq recently arrested four Iranian diplomats, two of whom
were thought to be members of the Revolutionary Guard.20 3 The diplomats
were suspected of providing explosives to Iraq to be used against U.S.
military. 2 °4 Even though the diplomats were released, this strategy is intended
to "chip away at their confidence. ' 20 5 These arrests were met with protest from
Iran. °6
The U.S. and Great Britain are increasing their combined military
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presence in the Middle East to deal with Iran.207 The U.S. has deployed a
second aircraft carrier (the USS John C. Stennis) and accompanying ships to the
Persian Gulf. This decision by the U.S. government doubles the U.S. military
presence in the Gulf. 20 8 Great Britain will also add two mine-hunting vessels to
its ships stationed in the Persian Gulf. 209 Although officials deny that the

United States is preparing for an offensive strike, "they acknowledged that the
ability to hit Iran would be increased., 210 The increased military presence is
intended "to make clear that the focus on ground troops in Iraq has not made it
impossible for the United States and its allies to maintain a military watch on
Iran., 21 1 The strengthened naval presence will also be able to enforce any
subsequent sanctions that the U.N. may impose on Iran. 2 Officials also hope
that naval presence will prevent Iran from "block[ing] oil shipments from the
gulf in retaliation for United Nations sanctions. 213
Increasing international financial pressure has significantly affected
Iran's economy. Iran's economic health is largely dependent on its foreign
capital ties, especially with Western countries. 214 Experts argue that "Iran's
economy is in desperate need of reform." 215 Iran needs $70 billion dollars to
restore its decaying oil industry.2 6 In early 2006, as tensions over Iran's
nuclear program mounted and the threat of sanctions seemed imminent, trade
and investment in Iran were negatively impacted.21 7 Amir Cyrus Razzaghi, a
Tehran consultant dealing with foreign investors, acknowledged that "[e]xports
to Iran dipped, and tens of billions of dollars of capital [were] moved out of
Iran."2 18 The stock market and real estate market have both suffered as a
result.219 Mr. Razzaghi also acknowledged that many foreign investors were

hesitant to invest because of the fear of impending sanctions.22
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The implementation of the U.S. policy to encourage foreign banks and
financial institutions to restrict ties with Iran has weakened the Iranian
economy. President Ahmadinejad, responding to the threat of international
financial pressure, announced a budget which would take a lower price for oil
Since Iran's budget is heavily dependent on oil revenues,
into account.
anticipates that the U.S. and its allies will reduce the
Ahmadinejad
President
price of oil in order to pressure Iran into cooperating. 222 Last year, Iran's
budget was based on $44 a barrel for oil. 223 The new budget is based on a price

of $33 a barrel.224 President Ahmadinejad does not appear to be yielding to
are ready, and we will manage the
economic pressure. He announced, "We 225
country even if you lower the oil prices[.],

The economic effect of reduced international financial investment in
Iran is apparent, notwithstanding the strength of President Ahmadinejad's
conviction to the contrary. Gal Luft, Executive Director of the Institute for the
Analysis of Global Security, revealed that "the Iranian economy is suffering a
great deal as a result of the economic punishment[.], 226 Kazem VaziriHamaneh, the Iranian oil minister, has admitted that Iran has "encounter[ed]
obstacles

in

financing

oil

projects.,

227

Mr. Vaziri-Hamaneh

further

acknowledged that "overseas banks and financiers have decreased their
cooperation[.],, 228 International business withdrawal has led Iran to attempt "to

secure gasoline imports from its allies, including Venezuela, and [to shift] some
dependency from gasoline to natural gas. 229 Iranian importers have also been
affected by the major banks' decisions to cut ties with the private sector. As a
totally
in advance
result, "many [importers are] having to pay for commodities 23
0
when a year ago they could rely on a revolving line of credit."
VI. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE IN IRAN
Members of the Iranian Parliament have become increasingly critical
of President Ahmadinejad's nuclear policy. The Iranian political system
consists of four political groups: reformists, pragmatic technocrats, radical
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hardliners, and mainstream conservatives.23
The reformist party has little
desire for a nuclear weapon, but instead advocates economic and social reform
as well good relations with the West.232 The pragmatic technocrats are
concerned with "rebuilding Iran's economy[,] and recognize that this is
impossible without vastly improved relations with the West in order to
encourage greater trade and investment in Iran. 233 They would like to see Iran
acquire a nuclear weapon, but are willing to sacrifice a nuclear program for
improved relations with the West.23 4 The radical hardliners, led by President
Ahmadinejad, are known to "pay little heed to Iran's economic woes, believing
that the Iranian people are willing to make further sacrifices in the pursuit of the
Islamic revolution. 235 President Ahmadinejad and the radical hardliners "are
determined to acquire a nuclear weapon, because they believe it is necessary to
their larger struggles with the United States, which they see as the principal
threat to Iran[.]." 236 The mainstream conservative political group includes
National Security Council Chairman Ali Larijani and Supreme Leader Ali
Khamenei.237 Khamenei has taken the "middle path, never curbing Iranian
nuclear and terrorist activity enough to satisfy the Americans, but keeping
things in check enough to allow the European and Japanese governments to
continue to trade and invest in Iran. 238
Some experts believe that Iran's leadership was surprised when
sanctions were passed, and that members of Iran's parliament have been
discussing a course of action to deal with U.N. sanctions. 239 Reactions by
Parliament members reveal dissatisfaction with President Ahmadinejad's
nuclear policy. For example, Mohammed Atrianfar, a political commentator
allied with former President Rafsanjani, has argued that "[i]f [Ahmadinejad]
wants to start a new war, from where does he think he's going to produce the
army? We are not agreeing with his radical, extreme policies. It is because of
the propagandist speech of Ahmadinejad all over the world that we're in the
situation we're in." 240 Another member of Iran's parliament, reformist Akbar
Alami, said that "[Ahmadinejad is] making some adventures in foreign
231
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relationships that don't benefit our country. The nuclear issue and the right of
Iran to have nuclear power is a matter of national pride. But we cannot limit
this issue to one person like Mr. Ahmadinejad. 24' Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, a strong supporter of the nuclear program, has not done much to
quiet critics of Ahmadinejad's policies, revealing that Khamenei may no longer
support Ahmadinejad's tactics. 242
The Iranian press, formally barred from criticizing Iran's nuclear
policy, has nevertheless expressed disapproval of the government's policies.243
Over the past few years, more than a hundred newspapers that have condemned
government policies have been shut down, and dozens of journalists have been
jailed.2 " Immediately following the Security Council's December decision,
most newspapers either refrained from expressing an opinion about the Security
Council's sanctions or criticized the imposition of sanctions on Iran.245
However, in the week following the announcement of the sanctions, several
moderate newspapers discussed the potential for the sanctions to have a larger
impact than the government had previously acknowledged.246 An editorial in
the newspaper Aftab-e-Yazd explained that an "'unreasonable and emotional'
reaction to the sanctions could be very dangerous. 247 Newspapers affiliated
with the reformist party similarly cautioned that the sanctions could have
serious consequences for Iran. 248 Fear of government censure is still apparent,
however, and the authors of newspaper articles on the subject
did not conclude
249
that the government should suspend nuclear development.
A new radio program called Goftegoo Radio has recently used the
Iranian airwaves to promote scholarly debate of Iran's current nuclear
position. 250 Heated discussions about whether Iran should continue its nuclear
program have been heard regularly on the program since its inception in May
2006.251 Guests of the radio program have candidly confronted the nuclear
issue.252 The program's guests have spoken boldly, criticizing the government
Id.
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244 Nazila Fathi, Tehran Radio Lets Critics Vent Over Iran's Nuclear Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1,
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for putting the nuclear program before the country's other more important
interests. 25 Their opinions suggest that many Iranians do not support the
nuclear program and would rather see the government's budget be used to fund
more vital needs.254 Sadeq Zibakalam, a professor of political science at Tehran
University who has appeared on the show several times, expressed outrage over
the government's attempt to link Iran's development with the nuclear
program25 Professor Zibakalam demanded, "Who says that we will lose our
national identity if we give up our nuclear program?" 256 Instead of pouring
large amounts of money into the nuclear program, he argued that Iran should
invest in hospitals and schools.257 He also criticized the government's failure to
address "the costs of sanctions or a military confrontation-[neither
of which
2 58
would] contribute to the country's development.
The results of recent municipal elections in Iran reveal that President
Ahmadinejad's policies are losing popularity among Iranian citizens. 9
Politicians aligned with President Ahmadinejad faired poorly in recent
elections.2 60 Election winners came from two very different political groups:
the conservative party and the reform party.26' Analysts have theorized that the
election winners, unlike President Ahmadinejad, "understand that [Iran's] future
requires good relations with foreign investors, trade partners and educational
institutions." 262 Voters have been dismayed that Mr. Ahmadinejad has been
ruining relations with foreign investors "by
defying the International Atomic
263
Energy Agency and the United Nations"[.],
Iranian university students have also protested President
Ahmadinejad's policies. 264 At one university where President Ahmadinejad
was speaking, students interrupted his speech, calling him a dictator. 65
University students have taken to protesting because they are angry that the
Iranian government has removed professors because of their political affiliation,
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and limited their own basic personal freedoms.266 Students also argue that the
Iranian government has damaged possibilities for their future by mismanaging
the economy and adversely affecting diplomatic relations. 67 Although many
right, many fear that the
students still believe that a nuclear program is their 268
government's nuclear program is harming the country.

VII. Is WAR LIKELY?
Tensions continue to escalate between the U.S. and Iran. The U.S. has
accused Iran of providing weapons to Iraqi insurgents battling American
soldiers. 269 An undisclosed Iranian official has acknowledged that Iran could do
more to prevent weapons from crossing over its borders.27 ° Some experts
believe that the U.S. administration is preparing to attack Iran, although U.S.
officials deny that military action is imminent.271
If an attack were to be initiated by the American military, the U.S.
government should be careful not to underestimate Iran's capabilities. In such a
situation, the U.S. would likely use military air strikes to target Iran's nuclear
facilities.272 The Pentagon has contingency plans for a war with Iran which
would include targeting "Iran's air-defense systems, its nuclear- and chemicalweapons facilities, ballistic missile sites, naval and Revolutionary Guard bases
in the gulf, and intelligence headquarters. 273 However, military officials argue
that an attack on Iran will only delay Iran's eventual nuclear independence.274
Officials claim that the only way to eliminate the threat of Iran gaining a
nuclear weapon would be to topple the Iranian government-and this is not a
feasible solution, considering the U.S. military's current weakened condition.275
Although a U.S. air attack could destroy many nuclear facilities, such an attack
is unlikely to destroy all of Iran's nuclear facilities because many sites are
unknown. 276 Experts believe that Iran would incite insurgents in Afghanistan
and Iraq to attack U.S. troops.277 Iran could also disrupt oil shipments from the
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CONCLUSION
The imposition of U.N. Security Council sanctions in December 2006
and March 2007 has not impeded Iran's nuclear proliferation. The possibility of
a nuclear Iran is a cause for international concern. If Iran develops a nuclear
bomb, it is likely that Iran could support terrorism more aggressively, without
fear of retaliation. In addition, other Middle Eastern nations might be
encouraged to develop their own nuclear weapons. The Middle East is an area
of the world where much turmoil already exists and the possibility of more
countries gaining nuclear weapons would undoubtedly cause more tension.
Increased international cooperation is necessary to compel Iran to
suspend its nuclear activities. Economic ties binding both Russia and China to
Iran once seemed to explain the reluctance of both countries to implement strict
sanctions against Iran. However, in recent months, both Russia and China have
demonstrated an encouraging degree of commitment to containing Iran. Further
support from Russia and China as well as other superpowers like Japan will be
needed to pressure Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.
The U.S. and its European allies have acknowledged the limitations of
U.N. sanctions, and have since instituted new strategies to isolate Iran by
persuading foreign governments and banks to sever their financial ties with
Iran. This initiative has already enjoyed some success. The economy of Iran is
showing the effects of decreased financial investment. Iranian citizens are
increasingly concerned about the state of the country's economy. President
Ahmadinejad rose to power because of promises relating to economic reform,
but he has done little to improve the situation.2 79 His focus on nuclear
development and failure to fix the economy has further disillusioned his
constituents. President Ahmadinejad's policies have also caused conflict in
Iran's parliament. The international community should take advantage of the
current economic, social and political climates in Iran by continuing to
condemn Iran's nuclear activities, while simultaneously withdrawing foreign
investment in order to further isolate Iran.
The U.S. and Great Britain have increased their naval presence in the
Persian Gulf, leading some to believe that military action might be imminent.
Military action should be a last resort. An air strike would be unlikely to
destroy all of Iran's nuclear facilities and might further encourage Iran to in fact
develop a nuclear weapon. A military action could also threaten troops
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currently battling insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq, since Iran possesses the
capability to supply those insurgents with weapons. 280 A military action might
also encourage Iran to support terrorist activities, including the bombing of U.S.
embassies abroad. 2 8' Finally, a military action would likely lead to the deaths
of innocent Iranian civilians, many of whom who do not support the President's
nuclear policy.
If Iran fails to abandon its nuclear program within 60 days of the
U.N.'s sanctions, the Security Council must act quickly to pass another set of
more stringent sanctions in order to demonstrate its commitment to addressing
the situation in Iran.212 Increasingly strict U.N. sanctions, along with
international financial pressure, will be necessary to significantly compel Iran to
cooperate and suspend its nuclear activities.
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